The case for a British task force in the Black Sea
The Memorandum | No. 21.2024
Since February 2022, Britain’s presence in the Black Sea has shrivelled up. Between 2014 and 2021, the Royal Navy deployed 11 warships to the Black Sea – most famously in June 2021, when HMS Defender challenged Russia’s illegitimate claims over Ukrainian waters surrounding Crimea. That no British vessel has visited the region since then is because Türkiye, which implemented the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention to bar passage of Russian and Ukrainian warships as belligerents through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, also asked non-regional allies not to risk escalation of the conflict by sending warships into the Black Sea (even though non-belligerent). Not wanting to antagonise Ankara, especially once Finland and Sweden opted to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in May 2021, Britain, like other allies, abided by the Turkish request.
This does not mean that Britain has ignored the Black Sea region. His Majesty’s (HM) Government continues to deploy the Royal Air Force (RAF) to Romania in support of NATO’s Black Sea Policing Mission, while the British decision to arm Ukraine may have played a decisive role in thwarting the Kremlin’s initial military advance. The UK struck again with the Tallinn Pledge in early 2023, and then again in early 2024, becoming the first nation to provide Ukraine with long-lasting security commitments. It has also taken efforts to sanction Russia’s shadow fleet and uphold food exports from Ukraine to the developing world – 400 million people in North Africa and Asia depended on cereals from Ukraine prior to 2022 – which the Kremlin has attempted to weaponise to discourage recipients from taking sides in the war.
Britain’s efforts in the Black Sea region, however, pale in comparison to its commitment to the Baltic terrains. Between 2017 and 2022, the UK provided the lion’s share of the forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Enhanced Forward Presence, acting as framework nation in Estonia and contributor in Poland. It also supports the Baltic Air Policing Mission, set up the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), entered into a defence treaty with Poland in 2018, provided unilateral security assurances to Finland and Sweden in 2021, and signed a defence agreement with Estonia in 2024.
Yet, it is the Black Sea region where Russia has pursued its revisionist approach to the Euro-Atlantic order most forcefully – perhaps even because of British efforts to ‘lock down’ the Baltic. And now, with Donald Trump’s re-election in the United States (US), it is unclear whether the Black Sea will experience further destabilisation. The President-elect has committed to end the war – one way or another. Will he attempt to force Russia to the negotiating table? Or will he ask Kyiv to surrender the occupied territories? There are two ways this could be achieved: one where Ukraine receives concrete security guarantees in exchange, backed by troop deployments from a coalition of the willing; or another which results in a new Budapest Memorandum or, even worse, a new Munich agreement, being foisted on the country.
Put simply, if Kyiv loses the war, the threat from Russia will grow; and if the Ukrainians win or receive security guarantees, the threat from Russia will not subside. Should the Kremlin remain in control of Crimea, it will possess a platform from which to strike Ukraine and contest the Black Sea. In keeping with their concept of ‘non-linear’ warfare, the Russians will use a wide range of ‘grey zone’ actions to enforce their writ and affect freedom of navigation. This may include blocking perimeters under the pretext of naval exercises, placing real or fake mines, intense electronic warfare, jamming and spoofing Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, abusive ship inspections, cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns. Russia could also mount false flag operations with naval drones launched from commercial ships to hit targets of critical infrastructure. In the event of future hostilities, Ankara may once again ask non-belligerents to remain clear of the Black Sea.
Thus, the time has come for HM Government to show decisive leadership. One way it could reshape the geopolitics of the Black Sea is by deepening engagement with Romania – a NATO ally which London could do more with. Earlier in November, Sir Kier Starmer, Prime Minister, met with Marcel Ciolacu, Prime Minister of Romania, for strategic consultations – but this was the first of their kind for 17 years. Romania is particularly important because it is building a large gas project called Neptun Deep in its southeastern exclusive economic zone. By 2027, Romania plans to become the European Union’s (EU) largest gas producer by exploiting up to 100 billion cubic metres from these offshore fields. This will allow Bucharest to decouple Moldova from Gazprom and reduce Russian interference. Romania could even become a supplier for Balkan countries such as Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. This would increase their resilience and, like Moldova, make them less susceptible to Russian pressure.
If the Black Sea’s resources are to be exploited, a free and open Black Sea is vital. For this reason, the three Black Sea NATO allies – Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria – began an initiative to combat floating mines earlier this year. Romania’s acquisition of two former Royal Navy Sandown class minesweepers will strengthen the country’s mine action capabilities, but both Romania and Bulgaria need to upgrade their navies to undertake more demanding operations.
This is where the UK comes in. To reassert and maintain NATO’s authority in the Black Sea, HM Government should work with Romania to establish a permanent naval task force there.
To remain in alignment with the Montreux Convention’s restrictions, this presence would need to be generated using Romanian shipyards. Luckily, on the Danube, in Galati, Romania has a major Dutch-owned naval shipyard – one of the largest in Europe – which has constructed large, modern warships for the Dutch and Pakistani navies. Once completed, these vessels could be transferred to the Romanian naval base at Constanta, with the ships’ companies provided through a joint British-Romanian programme – not unlike that envisaged in the AUKUS agreement with Australia and the US. The operating costs could also be shared between Romania and the UK.
In a perfect world, the two countries would together pursue a custom ship design for the most likely scenarios, but this would take years and come at significant cost. A better solution for generating a flexible and cost-effective capability quickly would be to procure a proven general purpose frigate design, such as the Type 31 class frigate. There is a precedent for this: Poland has already ordered three Type 31 class frigates of its own for operations in the Baltic Sea.
To ensure that at least two vessels are available at all times, four Type 31 class frigates would be required – two procured by Romania, and two by the UK. Two such warships, armed in the Polish manner, would provide up to 64 Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells which could each ‘quadpack’ short-range anti-air missiles (providing 256 missiles in total). Alternatively, they could carry up to 64 long-range anti-air missiles, anti-ship missiles or land attack missiles – or any combination thereof. Alongside either package, two Type 31 class frigates can carry an additional 32 canisters for anti-ship or land attack missiles, and two adaptable mission bays. They can also each hold a Wildcat helicopter carrying either 40 Martlet short range multi-role missiles or eight Sea Venom missiles between them.
As such, just two operational Type 31 class frigates could contain up to 328 missiles, which, when working in tandem with NATO air and land forces, would provide a formidable defensive screen with which to strengthen the alliance’s posture in the Black Sea.
It would also enable flexible response options to other contingencies, with the possibility of deploying minesweeper or undersea cable monitoring drones from the frigates’ mission bays.
Of course, the British component of this joint task force would have to stay within the Black Sea to avoid the restrictions of re-entry. But, given the weakness of the Romania and Bulgarian navies, they would send a powerful signal of HM Government’s intent to Russia, reinforce European security by upholding the Montreux Convention while guaranteeing NATO’s naval standing in the Black Sea, and cement the nation’s position as the leading sea power in the Euro-Atlantic. Such a flotilla would also dovetail with the UK’s decision, as per the 2024 Security Cooperation Treaty with Ukraine, to help develop the country’s navy and coast guard with the capacity to clear mines, conduct maritime reconnaissance, coastal defence and uphold freedom of navigation. And it would prove to an incoming Trump administration that Britain and Romania take their obligations to the defence of Europe seriously.
The establishment of a British presence in the Black Sea may sound ambitious, but the same once applied to the JEF or British troop deployments to Estonia and Poland, to say nothing of the formation of NATO and AUKUS. These measures bolstered international security and enhanced British influence; while a bold proposal, a permanent British-Romanian task force in the Black Sea would have a similarly disproportionate impact. It is entirely in keeping with the Foreign Secretary’s doctrine of ‘progressive realism’ and the Defence Secretary’s ‘NATO first’ defence posture, as well as their attempt to ‘reconnect’ with European allies – including Romania, a country of growing geopolitical significance.
James Rogers is Co-founder and Director of Research at the Council on Geostrategy.
George Scutaru is Chief Executive Officer of the New Strategy Centre. From 2014 to 2015, he was National Security Advisor to the President of Romania.
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