Untying Britain’s foreign and defence policy knot
The Memorandum | No. 13.2025
The belief of Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), that Europe should shoulder a greater burden for their defence was a stance he outlined clearly in his first term. It is no surprise, then, that early in his second term, Trump began a drastic reorientation of America’s defence and foreign policy for the Euro-Atlantic. However, his public condemnation and outright factual inaccuracies about Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, and degree of support shown for Russia, have caused surprise around the world.
The United Kingdom (UK) is perhaps one of the American allies most affected by Trump’s shift. Although the rhetoric around the ‘special relationship’ may at times delve into sycophancy, the two are intimate allies which have historically aligned when it comes to the overarching contours of their foreign and defence policies. The US has also become Britain’s largest trading partner since it departed from the European Union (EU). Trump’s return means Britain now not only needs to reorientate its relationship with the US, but also reconsider how it engages both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.
Perhaps it is now time for the UK to have a central leadership role in Euro-Atlantic geopolitics, and for the post-Brexit frost between Britain and the EU to thaw. There is a genuine case to be made that, aside from the US under Joe Biden, the UK has shown the greatest amount of leadership when it comes to the defence of Ukraine. Britain has been at the forefront of providing military aid, best demonstrated by the timely delivery of next generation light anti-tank weapons in January 2022, which were instrumental to the defence of Kyiv the following month.
The UK has also been a vocal supporter of Ukraine, and unafraid to use maximalist rhetoric and counter Russian disinformation publicly. It held the second Ukraine Recovery Conference, and two successive governments (and four prime ministers) have all been staunch defenders of Ukraine and opposed to Russia’s ambitions. The UK’s role in bringing the US and Ukraine back to the negotiating table after the now infamous White House spat between the American and Ukrainian Presidents demonstrates that Britain has the energy, and indeed centre of gravity, to play a decisive role in the Euro-Atlantic.
With the ‘special relationship’ staggering and defence intimacy with the EU curtailed, Britain may need to focus on pursuing closer relations with strategically aligned partners at the bilateral and minilateral level; more flexible arrangements which usually revolve around shared interests and trust.
But the UK’s defence relationship with the EU has been altered fundamentally by Brexit, and its bedrock is now much more fragile. Boris Johnson’s ‘hard Brexit’ saw the UK exit all forms of institutionalised cooperation with the bloc on defence and foreign policy, leaving cooperation much more tricky. And although there has been much discussion around the Labour government’s goal of an EU-UK Security Pact, the EU would have to make special considerations for Britain if it were to be considered at the highest level of partnership, or the UK would have to rejoin the European single market – both highly unlikely scenarios. As much as there may be a clear desire in the UK to demonstrate more European leadership in foreign and defence policy, it may not be able to get as close to the bloc as it had hoped.
With the ‘special relationship’ staggering and defence intimacy with the EU curtailed, Britain may need to focus on pursuing closer relations with strategically aligned partners at the bilateral and minilateral level; more flexible arrangements which usually revolve around shared interests and trust. In fact, the UK has already been utilising this strategy to some success, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. It will now need to accelerate its efforts in the wake of Trump.
Britain is engaged with both Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific nations in the acquisition of next generation capabilities. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) between the UK, Italy and Japan is a prime example of how the UK can avoid a cagey EU and unpredictable US in ensuring its military is modernised adequately and with speed. AUKUS – another minilateral based around defence-industry cooperation – is more problematic given America’s involvement.
Despite the Trump administration showing public support for the agreement, his unpredictability leaves American withdrawal – particularly from Phase 2 of Pillar I – as a not far-fetched contingency. If something like this were to occur, Australia and the UK should devise how best to continue pursuing Phase 3 of Pillar I, and importantly ramp up collaboration in building relations with other nations in the Indo-Pacific who have shared threat perceptions, such as the Philippines and Japan.
Indeed, greater flexibility and communication will be key for the UK in dealing with Trump-style disruptions, as will being innovative, pragmatic and forwards in engaging with other countries. The beginning of negotiations between Norway and the UK for a bilateral defence agreement serves as a good example of this approach in Europe.
The UK may also have to better recognise inconsistencies within its own policies compared to others, and how best to move forwards without compromising aspects of certain relationships. For example, Britain recently cut its international aid from 0.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 0.3% as it increased defence spending, while Australia is looking to increase its amount of aid as a result of Trump’s cuts to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), citing concerns around the effect this will have on Southeast Asia and the Pacific – sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific crucial to Australian foreign and defence policy.
Perhaps a more frank conversation between the UK and Australia around international aid needs to be had, and the best way for Britain to support the crucial regions of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, shy of providing more aid, hashed out – say, through upgrading the offshore patrol vessels HMS Spey and HMS Tamar, which have been permanently deployed in the Indo-Pacific since September 2021.
Trump’s reorientation of American foreign policy has been dramatic, but its ramifications could be a more independently minded Europe responsible for its own defence. Unconstrained by the EU, and already deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as well as Euro-Atlantic, there is space for the UK to fill certain gaps the US is leaving. But, it must embrace creativity, and look to work in more refined, interest-oriented groups, where differences can be easily overcome, and where levels of trust are high.
Patrick Triglavcanin is a Research Assistant at the UWA Defence and Security Institute and Associate Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy
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