Britain’s new government cannot afford another ‘east of Suez’ moment
The Memorandum | No. 03.2024
John Healey, Labour’s new secretary of state for defence, could be forgiven for not putting the United Kingdom’s (UK) geostrategic presence in the Indo-Pacific at the top of his to-do list. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the capability shortfalls the conflict has indirectly highlighted in Britain’s armed forces will be absorbing most of his attention, as well as Labour’s wider interest in repairing relations with the European Union (EU).
In opposition, Healey questioned the wisdom of deploying the UK’s armed forces to the Indo-Pacific as part of the Conservative government’s ‘tilt’ to the region. But if Labour opts to wind back a recently revived British military presence ‘east of Suez’ this would not be in the national interest.
There is no suggestion that Labour is about to weaken Britain’s commitment to industrial and technological collaboration with Indo-Pacific partners under the distinct AUKUS and Global Air Combat Programme tripartite initiatives. Still, Healey may feel his scepticism about the value of long range British military deployments was warranted, now that he has been briefed on the fiscal realities confronting the new government. Labour is likely to feel an additional political imperative to distance itself from the Indo-Pacific tilt as a Brexit-era initiative, and any perceived associations with post-imperial nostalgia in its framing by the Conservative government.
Yet the strategic trend is that Europe and Asia’s security storm clouds are undeniably merging, not least due to Russia’s deepening partnership with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The PRC and North Korea are both backing Russia’s revanchist bid to buckle the European security order. This offers them a potential precedent for, and a useful distraction from, their own revisionist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.
For now, Beijing’s support for Moscow’s war effort is less overt than Pyongyang’s. But the PRC has steadily amped up its material and diplomatic assistance for the Kremlin, while cultivating common cause with Europe’s spoilers Hungary and Serbia. The People’s Liberation Army recently conducted joint exercises with Belarus close to the Polish border. The authoritarian regimes of the PRC, North Korea, Russia and Iran are a disparate bloc, but they are now sufficiently aligned and emboldened to be treated as a trans-regional threat of global proportions. The PRC and Russia want to carve out spheres of influence in Europe and Asia, and to impose a defensive and static strategic mindset in both regions.
Given Moscow’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Britain’s Labour government has little alternative but to continue prioritising the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Euro-Atlantic security, as did its predecessor. But it must be careful not to draw in its strategic horizons too tightly, or to make Europe the centrepiece of its defence efforts for political reasons. The UK still has genuine global interests and UN mandated permanent security responsibilities. It should continue to adjust its strategic outlook and posture to a world where the epicentre of economic and military power has migrated permanently from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has done nothing to change this. If anything, it has accelerated the power shift eastwards.
Labour should therefore commit to maintaining a British presence across the Indo-Pacific which is not only diplomatic or commercial in nature, but also military. Not as a go-it-alone quixotic tilt, but an integral and essential tool in Britain’s statecraft.
Defence engagement with the Indo-Pacific is not only about countering threats. It is also about the UK pursuing a share in the rewards that the region has to offer and giving something back. Economic opportunity and strategic risk are considered opposite sides of the same coin in the Indo-Pacific in ways that are still unfamiliar to Europe, despite the continent’s rude geopolitical reawakening since February 2022. One of the most commendable features of the Integrated Review under the previous British government was its appreciation of the subtle interplay between prosperity and security in statecraft. That trade follows the flag once more was apparent in Britain’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, in 2023.
Labour’s new defence secretary should recognise that to keep pace with and manoeuvre in a fast changing world, Britain cannot afford to be militarily absent from the Indo-Pacific.
To be credible in the eyes of allies, trading partners and potential adversaries alike, British statecraft in the Indo-Pacific should incorporate military facets, to bolster its diplomacy and balance its economic ambition. Otherwise, the UK risks looking more like a mercantilist interloper than a durable partner with an active stake in the region’s stability. Doubling down on industrial and technological cooperation alone is unlikely to cut it as a British contribution to supporting the free and open international order in the world’s most important region. The UK needs to put skin in the game.
As a priority, Labour should honour the commitment under AUKUS to have a British submarine operating regularly from Western Australia later this decade. AUKUS is more than just a capability initiative. The forward deployment of American and British submarines to Australia directly supports collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Fielding a persistent British security presence in the Indo-Pacific is not only about counter-balancing the PRC or pleasing the Americans. Independent demand signals for more UK defence engagement are strong across the region, from Australia to Japan, including island nations in the Pacific such as Fiji and traditional defence partners in Southeast Asia, such as Brunei and Singapore, along with fledgeling relationships for example, Cambodia and the Philippines. Britain’s regional defence relationships are already paying off far beyond the frugal sums involved. Dialling them back would disappoint many, spiking Britain’s reputation as a reliable partner.
The forward deployment of two roving patrol boats to the Indo-Pacific since 2021 was a novel innovation in naval diplomacy on a shoestring. Forward immersion and the embedding of small units with niche competences within the region has helped to lift partners’ capacity, but also enabled His Majesty’s (HM) Government and its armed services to reconstitute their granular knowledge of the Indo-Pacific’s diverse defence environment. Labour could expand on this momentum by committing to replace the patrol boats with frigates later this decade.
The UK’s carrier and amphibious group deployments are more resource intensive. But expeditionary capabilities are a more obvious fit for this predominantly maritime theatre than European waters. They also generate opportunities to work with European partners outside of NATO’s confines and comfort zones, facilitating a multinational and better coordinated European defence presence in the Indo-Pacific. Britain’s ability to project force over long distances is limited but still confers convening power – by necessity.
The chastening reality is that Britain’s threadbare armed forces have no option but to make up for missing capabilities from allies and partners. That depends on the good will of European and Indo-Pacific countries to collaborate and to provide the necessary support. But if these habits of cooperation can be sustained and are not taken for granted, the result will be a net benefit for the UK’s interests and regional security.
In weighing his options, Healey faces an echo of the dilemma confronted by his forerunner and namesake, Denis Healey, who took the helm as Harold Wilson’s defence secretary 60 years ago. After the Sterling crisis, the earlier Healey opted to cut back Britain’s strategic cloth ‘east of Suez’ to fit a shrunken economic base (and respond to Soviet pressures in Europe). As a drawing down of imperial-era commitments, it was the correct call for the times. By contrast, Labour’s new defence secretary should recognise that to keep pace with and manoeuvre in a fast changing world, the UK cannot afford to be militarily absent from the Indo-Pacific.
Euan Graham is a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Previously, he was based in Singapore, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, where he was closely involved in organising the annual Shangri-La Dialogue.
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