How should the next National Security Strategy differ from the integrated reviews?
The Big Ask | No. 16.2025
With the approach of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit in June 2025, His Majesty’s (HM) Government has announced the planned publication of a National Security Strategy (NSS) prior to the summit, in conjunction with the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) commissioned in 2024. The aim of the NSS is to collate ongoing governmental reviews pertaining to the national security of the United Kingdom (UK).
HM Government published an Integrated Review (IR) in 2021, focusing on security and prosperity, and an Integrated Review Refresh (IRR) in 2023, which reflected the geopolitical changes since 2021. These strategies resulted in long, integrated documents, which took some time to put together. Therefore, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: How should the next National Security Strategy differ from the integrated reviews?
Director, British Foreign Policy Group
The biggest strength of the IR was that, through the concept of ‘Global Britain’, it set out a clear vision for the UK’s role in the world. The IRR did not quite have that level of clarity, and while the idea of ‘Global Britain’ now feels rather out of date, it is essential that the NSS develops a new national narrative which defines what the UK is and what it seeks to do in the world. This narrative should then be used as a guiding principle across all of Britain’s international activities, enabling the UK to act consistently and coherently at a time when it is easy for the turbulence of global events to push it to be reactive rather than strategic. It should also be firmly rooted in the UK’s role as a European security actor, which previous reviews have been uncomfortable to articulate fully.
Perhaps most importantly though, the new NSS must make difficult choices. Integrated reviews often fall into the trap of developing shopping lists of ideals of what Britain should do in the world. But, when everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. In a very difficult global context, it is essential that the NSS is clear-eyed about the global environment, and outlines a very clear set of priorities for UK foreign and security policy, excluding as many potential areas of focus as it endorses.
Senior Lecturer in National Security Studies, King’s College London
In an increasingly contested and multipolar world, the forthcoming NSS presents an opportunity to move beyond the prevailing fixation on major powers to acknowledge the strategic value of smaller states. Estonia’s cyber defences, Singapore’s regional diplomacy and Barbados’ climate leadership all demonstrate that small states can punch above their weight as innovative and agile partners. Strengthening ties with such actors can enhance the UK’s reach, diversify its sources of partnership and reinforce shared values.
Second, as defence commitments expand, the sustainability agenda must not be sidelined, but rather integrated into core strategic thinking. Climate change is a threat multiplier which affects operational effectiveness, including the resilience of infrastructure and supply chains, base readiness and logistics, and the ability of forces to be effective in extreme environments. At the same time, the security implications of a warming world – ranging from resource conflicts to disaster response – require coherent integration, not competition, with defence planning.
Finally, getting the strategy down on paper is only the beginning; to succeed, it must resonate beyond Whitehall. National security is a whole-of-society endeavour, and implementation depends on public understanding and support. This will require clear, open communication to demonstrate how security affects everyday lives. If it is not understood, supported or lived by its people, even the best strategic document in the world risks being shelved, not sustained.
Fellow, Yorktown Institute
HM Government’s announcement of a new NSS, likely to precede the ongoing SDR, comes at a critical juncture in British national security policy.
Geopolitical fault lines have shifted considerably in the five years since the Integrated Review was first conceived, and again further in the two years since its Refresh, conducted in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
A new government has since taken office, announcing a welcome uplift in defence spending to reach 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2027. Russia’s aggression continues largely unabated, threatening not just Ukraine’s ongoing territorial integrity, but that of European borders more broadly. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has not only risen on the international stage, but now enjoys an increasingly unchecked militarily assertive strategy for national rejuvenation – at the expense of the rules-based international order and democratic allies.
The IR, its accompanying Defence Command Paper and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy did a fair job in articulating the strategic outcomes, evaluating the methods available to achieve them and assessing the resources required to achieve them. While the strategic ends, ways and means were acknowledged, the weakness of these documents was a failure to realise that Britain must cut its cloak according to its cloth, with competing geopolitical priorities which now requires a more rigorous appraisal.
The NSS must focus on principal threats and challenges, seeking to work more closely with the UK’s traditional allies, while developing innovative new ideas, alliances and treaties, to solve the existing, developing and pacing threats to Britain’s national security.
Senior Lecturer, Deakin Centre for Future Defence and National Security
The biggest issue facing the UK’s next NSS is how it will respond to the impact of the second administration of Donald Trump, President of the United States (US) – not only on Britain’s own national security interests, but also the broader European and global security environments. The markers already set down by the new Trump administration hold the potential to undermine what have formed the pillars of the UK’s security since 1945.
The apparent desire for a rapprochement with Russia over Ukraine, combined with the administration’s visceral disdain for its traditional European allies, suggests if not an end to the US as Europe’s offshore balancer, then certainly to a much-circumscribed role, while its chaotic on-again, off-again tariff war on all and sundry threatens to unravel the global trading order.
This trajectory arguably presents Britain with a number of pressing near-term considerations which should be prioritised for its next NSS. Firstly, to develop a clear approach to prevent the defeat of Ukraine absent US support; secondly, to develop a coherent plan for the invigoration of NATO as the primary defence guarantor for Europe; and thirdly, to develop plans to address gaps created by withdrawal or retrenchment of American capabilities and/or risks created by over-dependence on US-sourced capabilities.
Director, Defence, Security and Justice, RAND Europe
A new NSS should provide the framework for a more engaged public conversation. It must prioritise an active, ongoing communication effort which speaks directly – and listens – to people across the UK and its Overseas Territories. This means fostering a nationwide conversation, from local communities to national media, about the value of defence, the broader concept of security, economic strength, national identity and resilience. Such deliberate engagement would not only build public understanding of security goals, but also encourage widespread ownership of, and commitment to, these goals.
There must also be a transformation of the relationship between defence and industry. To remain ahead of evolving threats, innovate at pace and bring this innovation to bear on the battlefield, a commercial/industrial domain of warfare needs to become an integral part of defence and military planning. The new NSS should promote a robust industrial base by generating market confidence, signalling that a strong industrial base is a critical component of extended deterrence. Greater emphasis on collaboration between HM Government and industry would drive innovation, secure supply chains and bolster readiness, and an industrial/commercial domain would improve innovation on the battlefield as well as the pace of learning and integration.
The UK needs a strategy which shifts the nation’s mindset to an understanding that defending the British way of life is an ethical investment – one to which everyone must commit.
Non-resident Fellow, Atlantic Council Europe Centre and Visiting Fellow, Third Way
The forthcoming NSS will be published at a time of extraordinary hazard for Britain, and should seek to mobilise all parts of government and wider society to increase resilience to the threats faced by the UK.
The risks have increased significantly in volume and complexity since the IRR. Russian aggression in Europe, a more assertive PRC and an unpredictable US present huge challenges to the international rules-based system which the British public has relied on for decades.
Meanwhile, hybrid conflicts relating to economic statecraft, offensive cyber campaigns, and political misinformation and disinformation grow in intensity, while disruptive events such as pandemics, severe weather, public disorder and other unpredictable events pose new threats.
The boundaries between foreign and domestic policy are increasingly blurred, and national security can no longer be an issue left only to diplomatic and defence specialists. It affects all areas of our lives and must involve us all.
I hope, therefore, that the new NSS will not only identify the key areas to improve British resilience across military, diplomatic, economic, political, social and technological issues, but will also start a wider public conversation across society about how everyone – HM Government, businesses and individuals – can contribute to our safety and security.
This approach has worked in countries such as Estonia, which has long faced an existential threat from Russia. The UK now needs to follow suit.
Co-founder (Research), Council on Geostrategy
In comparison to the IR and IRR, the new NSS should be:
Far shorter – not more than 25-30 pages. British strategic documentation has been getting longer and longer for years. The review team in the National Security Council Secretariat should be very strict; long-winded and repetitive text should be avoided. The NSS should also be peppered with more maps, lists and diagrams than the IR and IRR to communicate essential information;
More hard-headed. While the IR and IRR shifted the dial in terms of refocusing British statecraft on geopolitical competition, there was still too much waffle about ‘soft power’ and acting as a force for good in the world. The new NSS should focus more on identifying the UK’s national interests – more narrowly defined and ranked in order of importance – and the kind of strategies and instruments it needs to get its way in the world;
Less revolutionary. The NSS should not reinvent the wheel. The ‘strategic framework’ in the IRR, developed from the IR, should be the starting point for the new strategy. Where the NSS should differ is in going into more detail about how Britain will shape the international environment (especially in Europe), deter threats to its vital interests, enhance national resilience and cultivate strategic advantage;
More integrated. The IR and IRR attempted to provide a genuine national strategy, but the NSS could go further still. More thought is needed on how the national powerbase – the technological, industrial, financial and political institutions of the country, combined with its transport and communications system – can be grown to strengthen the UK’s hand. And in a world where the global economy is no longer as open as it once was, the NSS needs to identify how Britain can better protect and enhance its economic sovereignty, and use its financial and industrial power to secure its objectives;
Even bolder. Since 2021, HM Government has shown what can be achieved with proactive decision making. Guided by the IR and IRR, Britain has changed facts on the ground from the Black Sea (Ukraine) to the Indo-Pacific (AUKUS), often to its advantage. Insofar as a good defence depends on a strong offence, the NSS should continue to foster this proactive approach.
Former Director General for Security Policy, Ministry of Defence (2014-2018), and Visiting Professor, King’s College London
The document promised by Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, will be the third formal public restatement of Britain’s national security strategy in under five years. The previous documents contained comprehensive and fluent assessments of the changing geopolitical scene, but were soon overtaken by events. They were also too long – the IR had over 110 pages and the IRR had 60 – and with too many ‘priority actions’ or similar commitments (over 100 in each case). The next document should be radically different – a model might be the then-Labour government’s Defence Review of February 1966, which had only 15 A5 pages and was written tersely.
On 25th February, the Prime Minister said that ‘our whole approach to national security must now change.’ The new document must signal this change and provide a vehicle for a proper dialogue with the British public – which has not yet happened under the current or previous governments – about the growing threats and risks to the UK. The public document should be stark about the threats, but not alarmist. It should be underpinned by an internal, classified – and brutally realistic – net assessment of our strengths and vulnerabilities vis-à-vis potential adversaries; trying to capture the whole picture in one or more documents written for publication, as in the Integrated Reviews and their recent predecessors, is a mistake.
In terms of content, the new NSS should underline more clearly the essential interconnectivity between security and defence – as, in its time, the 2015 Review tried to do – in a world of intensifying military and hybrid threats. Similarly, it should emphasise the link between security and wider socio-economic resilience, and commit to producing a national defence and resilience plan. This time, it can dispense with analytical tools such as a ‘strategic framework’, but set a small number of more focused strategic priorities, with ministers already having indicated what these are likely to be. It needs to be clearer about taking a genuinely ‘national endeavour’ approach to nurturing key technological and industrial capabilities, not just nuclear.
And it should convey a greater sense of urgency.
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