Is it possible to split Russia and China?
The Big Ask | No. 11.2025
Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), has upended America’s recent foreign policy strategy by pursuing a thawing of relations with Russia. Some analysts have suggested that this could be part of a plan to pull Moscow away from Beijing and thus weaken the growing alignment between the two authoritarian nations. A new Chinese-Russian split may seem unlikely in the current geopolitical environment, but achieving this objective may aid the US to focus on the challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked seven experts: Is it possible to split Russia and the PRC?
Lecturer in Politics, Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London
The Russia-PRC alignment will likely remain robust at the strategic level, but the relationship between the two powers will become more flexible than before at the tactical level.
At the strategic level, Moscow and Beijing will still treat each other as valuable partners to reshape the Euro-Atlantic dominated international order. Hence, it is likely that they will keep up their joint military exercises, work together to strengthen the BRICS grouping, support each other closely in the United Nations (UN), and jointly push back against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) presence or influence in the former Soviet bloc and Indo-Pacific.
At the tactical level, Russia and the PRC will attempt to take full advantage of Trump’s foreign policy approach to try to cut deals with the US in order to advance their issue-specific interests, e.g., in relation to Ukraine and Taiwan. As a result, it should be expected that Russia and the PRC advance these interests with little coordination. Therefore, it may look as if the Moscow-Beijing alignment is weakening, but the reality is that there has always been tactical flexibility in their strategic relationship. This can be seen from the PRC’s refusal to provide overt support to aid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s formation of an alliance with North Korea, which complicates the Indo-Pacific security architecture – something which Beijing does not want to see – tells a similar story. These developments predated the second Trump administration.
Even if there is more evidence of tactical flexibility in Russia’s and the PRC’s foreign policy under Trump, their strategic alignment to create a multipolar world will likely remain robust.
Isabel Hilton OBE
Member of the Advisory Board, China Observatory, Council on Geostrategy and Visiting Professor at King’s College London
The proposition that the US can split Russia from the PRC draws inspiration from the rapprochement with Beijing in 1972 by Richard Nixon, President of the US (1969-1974), but the comparison is flawed. Nixon proposed the move, which Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor and Secretary of State for Nixon, first derided as implausible at a time when the PRC and the Soviet Union were in a decade-long confrontation – an antagonism so profound that each posted large numbers of troops to defend their mutual border, and Mao had ordered the digging of deep shelters and to ‘store grain everywhere’ to resist the anticipated conflict.
Today, the contrast could not be greater. On the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow and Beijing reaffirmed their ‘no limits’ friendship. The PRC has lent Russia material, economic, and diplomatic support for its war effort, without which Russia’s continued aggression would not be possible. Although the Ukraine war has some negatives from Beijing’s perspective, not least in its relations with Europe, it forces NATO to focus on Europe rather than building alliances in Asia. It is hard to see what Russia could win from Trump that Trump has not already given unasked. Besides, assuming there is another election, he will be gone in fewer than four years. Why risk the relationship with the PRC for that?
Senior Lecturer in International Peace and Security, King’s College London
The short answer is no. This idea of a so-called ‘reverse Nixon’ has been floated numerous times. However, we are no longer in the Cold War; at the time when the Nixon administration mended fences with Beijing in the 1970s, relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union were already poor. Therefore, we cannot compare the situation which exists now to that period.
The current bilateral relationship is strong, based on shared interests, and has been evolving steadily since before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not in the interests of either party to remilitarise their shared 4,200 km border, given that they almost went to war over it in 1969.
While Beijing may not wish to be ‘shackled to a corpse’, Russia will remain useful even if it loses the war. The PRC needs Russian gas (the Power of Siberia pipeline gives them access to cheap energy), and also benefits from Russia’s security presence in Central Asia where Beijing has clear economic stakes. Russia still needs the PRC for the dual use technology required for its war against Ukraine, but also for gas and oil revenues.
Dr Timothy Less
Convenor, Geopolitical Risk Study Group, Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge
There is only a slim chance of a complete rupture between Russia and the PRC, but it might be possible for the US to end the ‘no limits’ partnership between Moscow and Beijing, and restore the pre-2022 situation – or even pre-2014 – when Russia was closer to the Euro-Atlantic and further from the PRC. Judging by the anxiety in Beijing about the US’ rapprochement with Russia, the Chinese also believe this could be a possibility.
Russia has good reason for wanting closer relations with the US and Europe, even at the price of its close relationship with Beijing. Europe was, and could again be, a huge market for Russian gas and oil. Russia also fears the PRC, which is the dominant partner in their relationship, and one which makes no secret of its goal of ultimately integrating parts of Russia’s Far East into the Chinese state.
Any such pivot by Russia would, of course, be contingent. The country must be confident the US no longer threatens it, which would mean granting Russia a buffer in Ukraine, ending NATO expansion in the east and abandoning efforts at regime change in Russia. A pivot to the Euro-Atlantic would require the restoration of economic ties to replace those Russia has established with the PRC, beginning with the lifting of sanctions. It may also depend on reintegrating Russia into global governance institutions, such as the Group of Seven (G7).
None of this is straightforward, of course, and keeping Moscow away from Beijing would require constant work from the US, especially if, as would be likely, the PRC tried to decouple Russia from the US. The temptation for Russia would always be to balance between the US and the PRC, playing the two off against each other and extracting benefits from both, which is probably where things will end up.
Member of the Advisory Board of the China Observatory, Council on Geostrategy
If the US thinks that, in a world of strong-man leaders, it can pull off a ‘reverse Nixon’ – i.e., by exploiting a possible Russia-PRC split – but this time by pursuing detente with Russia, it is highly likely to fail, as things stand. The ‘no limits’ friendship between Moscow and Beijing is indeed more complex than it sounds. Russia is a heavily-dependent junior partner, the Russian elite sees itself in the vanguard of a revisionist struggle, and political tensions cut both ways, as do commercial frictions on the long Chinese-Russian border and in the Arctic.
Nevertheless, Russia and the PRC stand firmly behind the dictum of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), that the world is experiencing ‘great changes, unseen in a century’ – code for seizing the moment of the decline of the US, Europe and NATO, as they see it, to pursue their revisionist agenda. Russia depends on the PRC now for over a third of its trade, while financial, military and political links have been strengthened.
Notwithstanding Trump’s mercurial goals, Russia is fighting not for land but to deny Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state, and is likely to carry on fighting if NATO military and other support for Ukraine persists. Europe’s options and actions therefore are now critical.
If Moscow were ever to be split from Beijing, they would have to fall out, and free and open nations would have to be willing to replace the PRC commercially. Neither of these is likely any time soon.
Freelance Security and Defence Consultant
As a baseline, when assessing the goals and ambitions of the Trump administration, it is advisable to approach the understanding of ‘policy’ and ‘strategy’ with a degree of apprehension. The current Trump administration is marked by a unique quality of personalisation, in which policy aims are essentially reflective of Trump’s individual thoughts and desires. Whereas Trump has long since regarded the PRC as an economic rival, the current thawing of relations between the US and Russia seems largely driven by Trump’s own relation to Russia.
That being said, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing also functions fundamentally as a transactional one. Much of the Chinese-Russian coordination has been in the interest of creating a pole of opposition to free and open international order – much like 18th and 19th century Great Powers recognising their spheres of influence in a shared geographic region. Russia and the PRC have an interest in boosting their own military, diplomatic and economic positions, which is currently improved through strong mutual cooperation. However, despite their shared socialist history, which worked to challenge the sacrosanctity of the democratic governance model, enthusiasm for this necessary partnership remains tepid between the two nations.
A marriage of convenience is not a steadfast alliance, and thus is it conceivable to predict an inevitable loosening of Chinese-Russian ties. However, if there is any ideological connection in the relationship between Russia and the PRC, it stems from promoting a multipolar world order rather than one backed by US hegemony. Thus, pursuing friendlier relations with Russia is unlikely to help the US address challenges from the PRC, and any loosening of such ties is unlikely to advantage the US position greatly.
PhD Candidate, London School of Economics and Political Science
Russia’s current dependence on the PRC is uncomfortable for a Russian leadership which prides itself on its ability to pursue an ‘independent’ foreign policy. The overriding factor here, however, will be the Kremlin’s deep suspicion of America and its political system. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, may feel that he can come to an arrangement with Trump, but he knows that Washington’s leadership could change in four years. And, as the Europeans are realising, who can trust America at the moment?
This rules out a ‘reverse Nixon’-style Russian switch of alignment from the PRC to the US. It is not inconceivable that a Putin-Trump deal on Ukraine could pave the way for a Russian policy of equidistance between Washington and Beijing, but economic factors would likely prevent this. Infrastructure for exporting raw materials from Siberia to the PRC has been invested in at great cost, and Beijing now arguably has as much to offer its allies technologically as the US does. The Chinese leadership views the Kremlin as a valuable ally, and Beijing would be willing to use both carrots and sticks to keep Russia on its side. While Trump’s outreach to Putin could give Russia a stronger hand vis-à-vis the PRC, a split would be in neither Moscow nor Beijing’s interests.
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From what I've read on the topic, the likelihood of the Trump administration achieving a "reverse Nixon" looks somewhere between very difficult and impossible.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/the-myth-of-a-reverse-kissinger-why-aligning-with-russia-to-counter-china-is-a-strategic-illusion/
https://chinarussiareport.substack.com/p/attempting-a-reverse-kissinger-will
https://thebismarckcables.substack.com/p/on-the-attempt-to-pull-russia-from
https://thebismarckcables.substack.com/p/steel-man-argument-for-the-reverse
https://chinabusinessspotlight.substack.com/p/trump-russia-and-china-and-the-nixon
The notion of splitting the no-limits Axis of Russia-China is a mendacious fraud perpetrated by Maga Putin fanpunks and collaborator ex-generals peddling racist tropes. Nor is the Trump kleptocracy capable of a finessed strategy, or disloyalty to their Kremlin handlers. At best, PRC surprise at the totality of Putin's capture of the American state will produce caution and rebalancing with other BRICS and EU to constrain worldwide Russian expansionism.