How should the British-German defence relationship develop?
The Big Ask | No. 05.2024
The United Kingdom’s (UK) new government has declared that ‘resetting’ relations with Europe is one of its key foreign policy objectives and it has taken a number of steps to do so in its first month in power. On 24th July, Britain signed a Joint Declaration on Enhanced Defence Cooperation with Germany, with the aim of enhancing the security relationship between the two biggest European defence spenders.
While enhanced cooperation makes sense, the new Declaration is light on details for now. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked seven experts: How should the British-German defence relationship develop?
Evie Aspinall
Director, British Foreign Policy Group
Strengthening UK-German relations is as much symbolic as anything else. In a turbulent geopolitical environment and with the looming prospect that a second Trump presidency, the United States (US) may reduce its support for Ukraine, placing European, and particularly Ukrainian security at risk. As the two biggest European supporters of Ukraine in terms of military aid, strengthening UK-German coordination is designed to show their enduring commitment to European security, even if the US pulls back, and to encourage other European nations to remain committed to collective security as well. As leaders within Europe, it is their ability to hold together the European consensus and collective commitment to European security, which should be the first priority of the strengthened relationship, and the yardstick against which success will be measured.
There are clear practical ways in which the security relationship can, and should, develop as well though. Enhancing interoperability between the two militaries – and across the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – is essential to maximise efficiency. So too is strengthening strategic exchanges and joint training, as well as industrial collaboration, to ensure both nations are as well prepared as possible to meet changing global challenges, even as both nations face challenging domestic fiscal environments.
Prof. Amelia Hadfield
Head, Department of Politics, University of Surrey
British-German cooperation in defence should evolve along the lines set out by Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, and David Lammy, Foreign Secretary, at this year’s Munich Security Conference, where they outlined a broad UK-EU security pact, based loosely on supply chain security, climate security, and migration. Now in government, Starmer and Lammy have pressed ahead with a more comprehensive Joint Declaration between London and Berlin.
However, the details and timing of this agreement need greater clarity. John Healey, Defence Secretary, has argued that European security will be Labour’s ‘first foreign and defence priority’. But reaching out to key European Union (EU) countries such as Germany is not enough, Healey now needs to significantly enhance the previous government’s defence deal with Berlin.
Context is all important: the UK needs to reconnect itself with the EU, with EU partners in NATO and with the wider Euro-Atlantic region. Germany is an ideal partner in this respect. Both sides share similar approaches on the need to strengthen the European contribution to NATO, as well overhauling long overdue strategic cooperation in defence interoperability to boost effectiveness in the field, enhanced procurement cooperation to reduce grinding inefficiencies, and aligned research to ensure world-leading innovation. Few if any of these goals have seriously taken effect in the past, at least in the area of defence. Big ticket items like bolstering the Eastern Flank of NATO will help the UK and Germany support the Ukrainian war effort more effectively, but getting the basics right in terms of defence standardisation, and joint procurement initiatives is every bit as important.
Julian Pawlak
Research Associate, Helmut-Schmidt University
The British-German Joint Declaration offers both nations a significant opportunity to redefine their bilateral relationship and adapt European security dynamics in a ‘deteriorating strategic environment.’ Likewise, the Declaration provides a wide scope for action. As European nations increasingly seek to strengthen their defence capabilities, Britain and Germany, as two of Europe’s major military powers, should take the lead in developing a robust, interoperable force posture as the cornerstone of NATO’s European pillar.
This will require a synergistic relationship which builds on their respective strengths, focused on a shared strategic vision within the NATO framework. London and Berlin should also look to invest in advanced capabilities and new technologies while promoting more intensive methods of cooperation in areas of common interest.
Each of the mentioned ‘priority objectives’ offer many opportunities for intensification. To strengthen Euro-Atlantic security, a thoughtful, concerted development of both nations’ eastern flank support – from battle groups to security in the Baltic Sea region – would promote regional security and support NATO’s new defence posture. Additionally, opportunities to enhance interoperability exist throughout Europe’s northern flank, particularly in the maritime domain. The growing fleet of P-8 maritime patrol aircraft from Britain, Germany and Norway and the US is also fit for mutual support and burden sharing.
Finally, while recognising the hurdles and national caveats to defence industrial cooperation, a common strengthening of European cooperation in that regard is vital. Eventually, the practical outcome depends on whether and how both nations convert the commendable rhetoric into actual action.
Emma Salisbury
Sea Power Research Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
The British-German naval relationship should develop through a framework of cooperation, mutual trust, and strategic alignment to address common maritime security challenges. Given their shared interests in maintaining open sea lanes, combating piracy, and ensuring stability in the Euro-Atlantic, both nations can benefit from increased collaboration – particularly in the Baltic Sea.
Firstly, more regular joint naval exercises should be conducted to enhance interoperability and readiness. This would not only improve tactical coordination but also foster personal relationships, building trust and understanding at various levels of command.
Secondly, both navies should collaborate on technological advancements, particularly in areas such as uncrewed systems, electronic warfare, and intelligence gathering. Joint research and development initiatives could lead to innovations which benefit both.
Thirdly, diplomatic engagement through naval diplomacy, including port visits and participation in bilateral and international maritime forums, should be strengthened. These interactions can serve as platforms for dialogue and coordination on broader security policies, as well as the sharing of new ideas and best practice.
By focusing on these areas, the British-German naval relationship can continue to evolve, building a robust partnership which not only enhances the national security of both nations but also contributes to European and global maritime stability.
Dr Benjamin Tallis
Senior Associate, Centre for Liberal Modernity, Berlin
Britain and Germany have much to gain from closer cooperation – as does European security more broadly. The greatest benefit would come from developing complementary capability profiles which make the most of the two countries’ differing strengths – and cover for their weaknesses.
Rather than just a bilateral defence relationship, London and Berlin should embed their enhanced defence cooperation in a wider coalition of willing, proactive allies, to build a credible European Pillar of NATO with the necessary core land, sea, air and cyber capabilities, resources, troops, logistics and strategic enablers, air defence and strategic strike forces. This should drive coordinated force planning, joint funding and cooperative procurement that would be a boon for British and German defence industries, though both London and Berlin need to spend enough to make this viable.
However, effective teamwork also requires trust. The biggest current obstacle to building trust is that – as shown by the failed ‘Zeitenwende’ – Olaf Scholz’s chancellery does not share Britain’s strategic worldview (forcefully committed to Ukraine’s victory and to facing down authoritarian threats). Labour have more in common on security matters with future German governments which include stronger Green or Christian Democratic voices but, for now, London’s biggest contribution would be to join other allies in pushing Berlin’s strategic vision toward what should be common, team goals.
Gesine Weber
Research Fellow, German Marshall Fund
The signature of the British-German Joint Declaration was long overdue. When two major players in European defence team up bilaterally, it is certainly good news for European security as a whole. The Declaration should only be seen as a first step because much more remains to be done. Regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election, Europeans will have to step up in their own defence and cannot simply rely on Washington’s security guarantee.
On the political side, the UK and Germany must, at least together with France, and ideally also alongside Poland and Italy, lead the reflections on the future of European defence. In this process, Britain and Germany are also well positioned to outline how UK-EU and EU-NATO cooperation can institutionally contribute to the European security order. When generating the political ideas, the UK and Germany should also develop strategies to underpin them with credible military power and assurances.
A critical feature of the future of the British-German relationship ought to be continuity and reliability regardless of political change. The Brexit negotiations paralysed meaningful security and defence cooperation between the UK and Germany for years, but it apparently needed a Labour government to push the European agenda and the bilateral declaration forward – which was, of course, also easier for Germany with a coalition led and a ministry of defence held by the Social Democrats.
In light of the security challenges Europe is facing, Britain and Germany cannot afford such political games in the future: regardless of the political colour and priorities of governments in London and Berlin, defence cooperation should not fall victim to political games.
Prof. Richard Whitman
Professor of International Relations, University of Kent
The Joint Declaration should best be considered as a letter of intent rather than a clear road map for British-German defence cooperation. Berlin and London have made significant contributions to addressing Europe’s primary security threat, in their support for Kyiv’s defence against Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine. But their stances on the future of Euro-Atlantic security are not entirely in sync. Germany possesses the financial resources to boost Europe’s military security capabilities but appears to have brittle political support for the task. The UK has more solid political foundations but shaky financial resources from which to boost the necessary capabilities.
The immediate priority for the relationship should be to look where the Declaration commitment to defence industrial collaboration can be leveraged to meet another joint goal in the text: to coordinate long term military support to Ukraine. Britain and Germany are currently leading nations in different ‘capability coalitions’ that have been put in place to build the capabilities of Ukraine’s forces.
Immediate focus should be on what Germany can contribute to the UK-led coalitions on drones and maritime security; and conversely the UK contribution to the German-led coalitions on armour, and integrated air and missile defence. If London and Berlin could make agreements in pooling and sharing their national deployments, capabilities and production facilities in these areas could they release greater resources for Ukraine?
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What do you think about the perspectives put forward in this Big Ask? Why not leave a comment below?
The joint declaration was strikingly (laughably, insultingly) devoid of detail. But it is a distraction from a simple truth: Germany is underspending on defence, Boris Pistorius knows this, he has been knocked back massively for next year’s budget, and Olaf Scholz doesn’t want to increase the Bundeswehr’s budget by anything like what’s needed. We can pour warm words in Berlin’s ear all we like but that is the fundamental challenge.